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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REAPPORTIONMENT OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS
Petitioner, a taxpayer and voter in Midland County, Texas,
sued in state court to force the redistricting of the Midland
County Commissioners Court. The court had been created in
the Texas Constitution which provided that it should have gen-
eral governmental powers over the entire county. The court
itself was composed of a county judge, elected at large, and four
members, chosen from districts whose populations were, re-
spectively, 67,906; 852; 414; 828.1 Petitioner, a resident voter
of the largest district, alleged that the disparity in population
in the districts resulted in an unconstitutional dilution of his
vote which violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution. The state trial court ruled
for petitioner and ordered adoption of a new plan of dis-
tricting based on population. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals
reversed.2 Its decision was overturned by the Texas Supreme
Court,3 which ruled that the existing districting scheme was
impermissible, but that factors other than population could be
considered in redistricting. 4 This decision was, in turn, reversed
by the United States Supreme Court, which held, local govern-
mental units with general governmental powers over an entire
geographic area cannot be apportioned among single member
districts of substantially unequal population. Avery v. Midland
County, Texas, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
History of Reapportionment Cases
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion prohibits the states from denying persons within their juris-
dictions equal protection of the laws.5 But the prohibition is
not absolute. It precludes states from establishing arbitrary and
unreasonable classifications, but they may classify persons dif-
ferently if the classifications are rational means of attaining
legitimate state objectives and if all those who stand within the
1. The first district contained the City of Midland. The other three districts
were rural.
2. 397 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
3. 406 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1966).
4. Id. at 428. The Texas Supreme Court said factors such as the number of
qualified voters, land areas, geography, miles of county roads and taxable values
could also be considered in making a constitutional districting plan.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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same class are treated similarly6 The Supreme Court interpreted
the prohibition to extend to any action by a state, its agencies, 7
or instrumentalities."
In Baker v. Carr9 the Court held that a federal district court
had jurisdiction over disputes concerning apportionment of
state political units and ordered a remand for a determination
of whether or not the Tennessee legislature had violated the four-
teenth amendment by failing to reapportion itself. Other cases
challenging existing apportionment schemes followed in rapid
succession. In Gray v. Sanders,1 Georgia's county unit system
was challenged. Under this system the winner of a majority of
the counties was the winner of the election, irrespective of the
popular vote. In striking down this procedure Justice Douglas
said: "Once the geographical unit for which a representative be
chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to
have an equal vote."'  The following year, reapportionment of
districts on a population basis was extended to federal congress-
ional districts within a state.' 2 The Court in Reynolds v. Sims"
extended the reapportionment concept to both houses of a state
legislature. The majority in that decision held apportionment
on a population basis was required in both houses of a bicameral
legislature by the equal protection clause. The Court made it
quite clear that equality of population was the determinative
factor in districting, although conceding that "mathematical
exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional re-
quirement.' 1 4
The Avery Decision
In the great majority of cases decided after Reynolds v. Sims,
the highest state courts have applied its principles to local gov-
ernmental units.' 5 The Court upheld this state court practice
6. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942); Dominion Hotel, Inc. v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 265 (1919).
7. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
8. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
9. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Prior to this decision the Court had refused to accept
jurisdiction in cases involving reapportionment of state political units. This re-
fusal was based upon the rationale that the question presented was a political one
and not justiciable. South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950) ; MacDougall v. Green,
335 U.S. 281 (1948) ; Colegreve v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
10. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
11. Id. at 379.
12. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
13. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
14. Id. at 577.
15. Miller v. Board of Supervisors, 63 Cal.2d 343, 405 P.2d 857, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 617 (1965) ; Montgomery County Council v. Garrott, 243 Md. 634, 222 A.2d
164 (1966) ; Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E.2d 787, 262 N.Y.S.2d
591 (1965).
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in Avery.16 States must insure that general local governmental
units to which they have delegated law-making power are elected
by persons having equally effective votes. However, all local
units are not within the scope of the present ruling. The Court
distinguished between units with general responsibility and
power and special units.17 The former alone come within the
Avery holding. To be general units, they must meet what the
writer sees as two tests: (1) they must have "power to make a
large number of decisions having a broad range of impacts,"' s
and (2) the decisions must affect all of the constituents of the
unit.19
The instant case holds that "no substantial variation from
equal population in drawing districts"20 is permissible. As the
dissenters point out,21 this seems to leave the legislature little
discretion in constructing or reconstructing local districts. The
Court rejects the other possible bases for districting listed by
the Texas Supreme Court,22 but it does state the Constitution
does not impose a "uniform strait-jacket ' '23 which would prohibit
local experimentation. The majority decision specifically reaf-
firms two previous decisions in which the Court has declined
to impose a strict one man-one vote requirement-Sailors v.
Board of Education and Dusch v. Davis.24 In Sailors the Court
approved a plan in which districts of unequal population elected
16. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
17. Id. at 483.
18. Id. at 474. The Texas Supreme Court found that the legislative functions
of the Commissioners Court were negligible. But the United States Supreme Court
stated that most local units could not be categorized as legislative, administrative,
or judicial. It found that the functions of the Texas unit did meet the test quoted
in the text. The unit had power to tax, issue bonds, budget the county's funds, and
maintain roads and buildings. In his dissent, Justice Fortas stressed the extremely
limited nature of these powers. Id. at 502-04.
19. "Were the Commissioners Court a special purpose unit of government as-
signed the performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more
than other constituents, we would have to confront the question whether such
bodies may be apportioned in ways which give greater influence to the citizen most
affected by the organization's functions. That question, however, is not presented
by this case .... " Id. at 483-84. The Court said that while the work of the
Commisioners Court did concentrate on rural affairs, most of their decisions af-
fected all the citizens of the county. In his dissent, Justice Fortas agreed that the
one man-one vote principle should apply to governmental units whose impact is
evenly felt by all its constituents. But he argued that the Commissioners Court
was not such a unit. Practically speaking, he said, its impact was much greater on
its rural constituents than on its urban ones. Id. at 507.
20. Id. at 485.
21. Id. at 492, 493, 509.
22. See note 4 supra.
23. Avery v. Midland County, Texas, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968).
24. Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967); Dusch v. Davis,
387 U.S. 172 (1967).
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(at large) individual school boards to represent each district.
The elected school boards each appointed one delegate to a bi-
ennial meeting at which a five man county board was elected.
In upholding the selection of the county board, the Court
stressed the appointive nature of the plan and the very limited
administrative powers exercised by the board. In Dusch the
Court upheld an electoral system in which seven members of
a county governing board were elected at large but were re-
quired to be residents of certain districts. The remaining four
members were elected with no residence requirement. The Court
said that members represented all of the county, not just the
district of their residence. From the holdings in these cases it
seems that although the Court may allow some other factors
to be considered in unusual cases of districting, even in such
unusual cases the population factor must be controlling, and
anything other than slight deviations from it will not be tol-
erated.
25
The immediate effect of this decision will be felt swiftly
across the United States. Considering county governing bodies
alone, it is estimated that of the 1,900 which are elected by dis-
tricts, 1/2 to 2/3 are malapportioned.2 6 Heretofore, the image
these county governmental units have projected has been rural
and anachronistic. Those constituents living in the densely pop-
ulated and underrepresented areas of the county have been
unable to exercise the influence to which their numbers entitle
them; and consequently, they have turned to sub-units, such as
municipal governments, to achieve their programs. The reappor-
tionment of the county body should increase the importance
of the county as a general governmental unit at the expense of
the independent subunits, as it becomes more responsive to the
needs of all its people.2 7 The change in voter influence will result
in policy changes as more emphasis is placed on urban and sub-
urban needs, such as improved police and fire protection and
improved educational and recreational facilities.2s As urban
interests on the county boards increase, city-county cooperation
should improve and more movements to consolidate county and
25. Slight deviations based upon legitimate considerations of rational state
policy are allowable. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964). This does not
include historical, economic, and geographical considerations. Lucas v. Forty-
Fourth Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 738 (1964).
26. Grant & McArthur, "One Man-One Vote" and County Government: Ru-
ral, Urban, and Metropolitan Implications, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 760, 766 (1968).
27. Id. at 768.
28. Id. at 767.
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city governments should develop to prevent duplication of
services.29
As a result of the Avery decision, experimentation with
electoral methods other than single member districts may in-
crease. The apportionment problem can be eliminated by the use
of at-large elections in which all the constituents vote on all the
members of the elected body. There are no districts so there can
be no malapportionment of them. But at-large elections present
another problem-possible discrimination against minority in-
terests which may often be unable to elect even one representa-
tive in this system. There are other alternative electoral systems
which may be tried.3°
These include:
(1) Representatives elected from large multi-member
districts. This method, though subject to the one man one-
vote principle, allows greater flexibility than single member
districts because traditional district lines may be maintained
while the number of representatives per district can be in-
creased or decreased as population varies;
(2) Some representatives elected at-large and others
from equally apportioned districts. This combines the ad-
vantages of both systems;
(3) Representatives elected at-large but with resident
district requirements probably assuring representation to
important factions in the community. This was the plan up-
held in Dusch v. Davis;
(4) Proportional representation. The various parties or
groups are elected in proportion to the number of votes they
receive. Although this assures minority representation on
the governing body, it weakens the traditional two-party
system and has been abandoned in almost every American
jurisdiction which has tried it;
(5) Representatives chosen by a weighted voting sys-
tem. Unequal districts are used but each representative casts
29. Id. at 774. There could also be a decline in city annexation of suburbs in
large metropolitan areas as the suburbs look to stronger, more responsive county
governments. Id. at 775. All of these increased demands on the country unit should
accelerate the modernization of county administration. Id. at 767. These results of
reapportionment will vary in intensity around the country as particular state laws
and voter attitudes towards the changes moderate or accelerate them.
30. Jewell, Local Systems of Representation: Political Consequences and Ju-
dicial Choices, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 790, 805 (1968).
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votes in proportion to the population within his district.
These various systems of voting have not been approved or
invalidated by the Supreme Court at the present time. Any
utilization of them presumably must at least comply with the
principle underlying Avery-each individual's vote should
be of equal weight.
Avery's Application in Louisiana
The Louisiana police jury system is clearly within the type
of county (parish) unit ordered reapportioned in Avery. Police
juries are composed of members elected from districts within
the parishes.31 Many of their powers are general in nature and
extend over the entire parish which the jury serves. For in-
stance, the juries have the power to draw their own district
lines, levy property taxes within set millage limits, and pass
ordinances concerning trespassing, places of public entertain-
ment, livestock control, and maintenance of parish buildings
and roads.3 2
Already there has been some application of the ruling in
the instant case to Louisiana police juries. Lafayette Parish has
been ordered to present a plan to correct the "gross dilution"
of the weight of individual votes in Ward Three which contains
the city of Lafayette.3 3 This ward has 65% of the total popula-
tion and six jurors. The other nine wards have one juror each.
The federal district court referred the police jury to the guide-
lines set for the state legislature in Bannister v. Davis 34 and to
the Dusch decision" for assistance in redistricting.
31. For the election of police juries parishes are divided into from five to
twelve wards. LA. R.S. 33:1224 (1950). The voters in each district vote for the
jurors to represent their wards. As the population in the ward increases additional
jurors may be added. After the population of the parish exceeds 175,000, no new
jurors may be added. LA. R.S. 33:1222, 1223 (1950). Malapportionment results
from failure to add extra jurors as the population in a ward increases or from
failure to redraw district lines as the population shifts or increases.
32. LA. R.S. 33:1236 (1950).
33. Simon v. Landry, 286 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. La. 1968).
34. 263 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. La. 1966). The following guidelines are set forth
by the court: (1) Districts should be compact; (2) Boundaries of existing po-
litical subdivisions should remain intact if possible; (3) Total population, not
voting or citizen population, should be used as a 'base; (4) Fractional and weighted
voting systems should not be used; (5) If possible, multi-member, multi-parish
districts should be avoided; (6) There should be no gerrymandering of districts.
Three methods for testing the fairness of an existing or proposed apportion-
ment scheme are indicated: the population variance test (the ratio between average
population per representative in the most over-represented voting district and the
most under-represented district), the maximum detrimental deviation from the
average percentage (the ratio between population per representative in the most
under-represented district and the average population per representative), and the
minimum controlling factor test (the ratio between the population of the minimum
number of districts needed to elect a majority and the total population).
35. 387 U.S. 112 (1967).
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The reapportionment of the police juries will likewise affect
the reapportionment of parish school boards since parishes with
police jury systems choose school boards from identical dis-
tricts.36 The legislature may change this procedure, but Avery
must be complied with if the school boards are to continue to
have broad general powers and are to be elected from districts.
Also affected by Avery will be malapportioned city councils and
other municipal bodies elected from districts.3 7 However, the
greatest number of local units are appointive or for special pur-
poses or both and they should be unaffected.
3 8
Conclusion
The Avery decision is the latest in the logical progression
of reapportionment decisions beginning with Baker v. Carr.
Whether it will be the latest remains to be seen. There are few
governmental entities which have escaped the attention of the
Supreme Court in this area. The only local units excluded from
the Avery holding are those not chosen from districts, those
that are appointive, and those established for special purposes.
Each of these categories presents problems that are apt to be
litigated. At large elections will be tested for what some consider
an unconstitutional dilution of minority votes. The exemption
of appointed bodies from the reapportionment principle is
thought unwise by some writers ;39 and if, in an effort to circum-
vent Avery, important general governing bodies are made ap-
pointive, the practice will likely be tested. As for the special
purpose category, the term is so vague and the definition of gen-
eral unit so broad that many local units considered special pur-
pose could be categorized as general and brought within the
instant holding. In addition, the Court may decide to face the
problem of partisan gerrymandering of districts, a related area
which it has so far refused to enter for many of the same rea-
sons it so long refused to consider reapportionment cases.40
Sally Brinkley
36. LA. R.S. 17:52 (1950). The Sailors case is not controlling here since that
case involved a special fact situation-a school board of limited powers which was
not directly elected.
37. An example in Louisiana is the aldermen in the Mayor-Alderman Plan, as
provided for in LA. R.S. 33:321-481 (1950).
38. For example, water districts, drainage and sewerage districts, planning,
and zoning commissions.
39. Jewell, Local Systems of Representation: Political Consequences and Ju-
dicial Choices, 36 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 790, 796 (1968).
40. See note 10 supra. However, the Court has outlawed gerrymandering of
districts on the basis of race. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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